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The Seventeenth Party Congress provides HuJintao, China’s president and Communist Partychief, with an opportunity to set the policy agenda
for his second five-year term, as well as line up his succes-
sor. All of Hu’s key decisions will be focused on promoting
policies designed to achieve a “harmonious society” in
China. His task will not be easy, as his plans create many
apparent contradictions and are at odds with the approach
taken by Party leaders over past decades. 
Hu is asking his government to abandon its 25-year-old pol-
icy of striving for the fastest possible economic growth,
regardless of the costs to society and the environment.
Instead, he wants China to balance sustainable growth with
a programme to redress the many negative consequences of
two decades of 9%-plus GDP growth. It will not be easy for
Hu to convince the millions of officials who serve him across
the country to change the way they behave and spend their
budgets. These are, after all, bureaucrats who have always
worked under the policy that faster is better. Faster growth
in GDP, tax revenue and job creation meant faster promo-
tions. “Soft” criteria such as pollution and school drop-out
rates rarely entered into the personnel calculus.
Before Hu can even begin to tackle the many tough problems
standing in the way of creating a harmonious society, he must
first convince sceptical local governments and Communist
Party organisations that his new, less growth-centric approach
makes sense. This will be as big a challenge as cleaning up
China’s filthy rivers and reducing rampant corruption.
As the leadership prepares for the Party Congress, we imagine
that Hu has asked the policy research office of the State
Council (his cabinet) to prepare a report explaining the “har-
monious society” concept. This will be Hu’s primary opportu-
nity to convince senior Party officials to put all of their political
weight behind implementation of the programme.
What follows is our interpretation of what this State Council
report to Party Congress delegates might look like. It is pre-
sented in the belief that Hu’s “harmonious society” campaign
will have a profound impact on government spending and reg-
ulatory policy—and thus the Chinese economy and invest-
ment environment—over the coming five years. The success
of Hu’s campaign will also be critical to the ability of the
Chinese government to manage the social and political con-
sequences of the economic downturn which will inevitably
come to the mainland during the next five to ten years.
Striving for Economic and
Political Sustainability
ANDY ROTHMAN
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Hu Jintao, China’s president and Communist Party chief, is asking his government to abandon its 25-year-old policy
of striving for the fastest possible economic growth, regardless of the costs to society and the environment. Instead,
he wants China to balance sustainable growth with a programme to redress the many negative consequences of two
decades of 9%-plus GDP growth. Although we do not expect Hu to fix China’s health care system or to deliver a clean
and green environment in just five years, we do anticipate enough progress to be achieved so that when the
inevitable economic downturn arrives in five to ten years, the country will avoid political and social chaos. And while
Hu is willing to accept slightly slower economic growth to manage the problems that threaten social stability, he con-
tinues to understand that a strong economy is the foundation for a harmonious society.
Striving for Economic and Political Sustainability
“Dea r  Pa r t y  Congr e s s  d e l e ga t e s ,
We have been very lucky. Over the last 15 years, China’s
GDP growth has ranged between 7% and 14% and we have
not experienced a single economic or financial crisis.
We have also avoided any serious social crises.
But we would be foolish to expect this long streak of good luck
to continue indefinitely. As our economy becomes more mar-
ket-oriented, an economic downturn, accompanied by high
unemployment, is inevitable.
And history tells us that a sustained period of economic
growth does not guarantee social and political stability.
Europe’s Industrial Revolution was, for example, followed in
fairly short order by the social revolutions of 1848. It is instruc-
tive to briefly review that experience.
Th e  I ndus t r i a l  R ev o l u t ion  and  Ch in a
In the 1780s, at the start of the Industrial Revolution, Europe had
much in common with present-day China. Europe was over-
whelmingly rural then, and today 60% of Chinese live in the coun-
tryside. Agriculture was largely inefficient in Europe then, as it is
in China now. And most people were poor: the average annual
per-capita consumption of tea in England was barely two ounces. 
But the Industrial Revolution—what some who do not know
Chinese history call the most important event in world histo-
ry—changed everything. With government policy supporting
the private sector and profits, the modern factory was invented
and trade took off. The export of British cotton increased more
than ten times and unprecedented wealth was created.
That rapid growth and astounding wealth did not come with-
out negative consequences. “The Industrial Revolution created
the ugliest world in which man has ever lived, as the grim and
stinking, fog-bound back streets of Manchester already testi-
fied.” According to eminent scholar Eric Hobsbawm: 
“Towns and industrial areas grew rapidly, without
plan or supervision, and the most elementary services
of city life utterly failed to keep pace with it: street-
cleaning, water-supply, sanitation, not to mention
working-class housing.
The transition to the new economy created misery
and discontent, the materials of social revolution. And
indeed, social revolution in the form of spontaneous
risings of the urban and industrial poor did break out,
and made the revolutions of 1848 on the continent,
the vast Chartist movement in Britain. Nor was the
discontent confined to the labouring poor. Small and
inadaptable businessmen, petty bourgeoisie, special
sections of the economy, were also victims of the
Industrial Revolution and of its ramifications. Simple-
minded labourers reacted to the new system by
smashing the machines which they thought responsi-
ble for their troubles; but a surprisingly large body of
local businessmen and farmers sympathised profound-
ly with these Luddite activities of their labourers,
because they too saw themselves as victims of a dia-
bolical minority of selfish innovators.
Such was the situation of the labouring poor, and
especially the industrial proletariat which became
their nucleus, that rebellion was not merely possible,
but virtually compulsory. The revolution of 1848 was
its direct consequence.”
Many of you will recognise some of the precursors to the 1848
revolution from our current situation in China. And it is worth
recalling what happened when an economic crisis due to failed
harvests and industrial recession ignited the unstable social cli-
mate: revolutions across the European continent that led to the
fall of many leaders, the break-up of an empire, and the spread
of parliamentary governments. 
There are many differences between Europe of the early
1800s and modern China, but there are enough similarities to
remind us that we cannot rest on our achievements of the past
two decades. As in Britain, our successes have left many
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behind, and those citizens will eventually make their voices
heard—unless we proactively address their concerns.
We  a r e  no t  immune  to  r e c e s s ions
We must also acknowledge that our long, uninterrupted streak of
economic growth does not mean we are immune to recessions
and financial crises. All market economies are subject to reces-
sions, and now that 70% of our GDP comes from the private
sector, we should assume that a recession lies somewhere over
the horizon. All emerging markets, no matter how successful,
have experienced financial crises. The US, as an emerging mar-
ket, was a good example: there were financial crises in 1819,
1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1890 and 1893. Several of those crises
were connected with or followed by protracted depressions. 
Economists are not very good at predicting exactly when such
a crisis may come, or the specific problem that may trigger it,
but statisticians can tell us with confidence that the odds are
that we will experience an economic or financial crisis during
the coming ten years. The current economic environment is
certainly strong, so we can be optimistic and believe we have
about five years to prepare, but we must not deny that the
medium-term risks are significant.
Party Congress delegates, we face many huge challenges—from
a broken health care system to environmental disaster, as well
as rural poverty, corruption and the absence of the rule of
law—but we should read this list as a call to action, not as a
sign of impending catastrophe. China has overcome equally
daunting challenges in the recent past.
We have an appetite for risk
During the past two decades, our predecessors in the Party lead-
ership have shown foresight—and an appetite for risk. We have
taken radical steps to ensure continued economic growth and social
stability, which has meant continued leadership of the Party.
Some of those steps may not seem quite so radical with the
passage of time, so it is worth reviewing them here:
Recognising that the command economy was unsustainable,
between 1995 and 2001 we laid off 46 million state-sector
workers—equal to sacking the combined workforce of France
and Italy in six years.
We privatised the housing market, moving quickly from 15% to
70% urban homeownership. Some have called this transfer of
previously state-owned housing to the workforce the largest
one-time transfer of wealth in the history of the world
We relaxed controls over entrepreneurs, which allowed the pri-
vate-sector contribution to GDP to rise from only 17% in 1990
to 70% today.
We withdrew government control over prices of almost all
goods and services, allowing them to be set by the market.
We built a very impressive economic infrastructure in our
cities, and since 2000 have added electric power generating
capacity equal to the combined installed capacity of the follow-
ing countries: Thailand, Poland, Ukraine, Spain, Italy, South
Korea and the UK.
We opened our markets to the outside world and joined the
WTO. As a measure of openness, imports make up 30% of
our GDP, about double the ratio in Japan and the US.
We significantly reduced Party intervention in the daily life of
our people, providing them with much greater personal free-
dom, including access to information and the right to criticise
their government.
So while earlier we said we have been lucky to avoid crises in
the past fifteen years, actually, we have taken many proactive
steps to create our own luck. Our predecessors in the Party
leadership learned from their mistakes, and from the history of
other nations. We must continue to learn from our mistakes
and take similarly radical steps to deal with the problems
China now faces.
Dealing with negative consequences
The most fundamental problem is dealing with the negative
consequences of twenty-five years of unrestrained economic
growth. Poverty persists in the countryside and income
inequality has been rising. Our education and health care sys-
tems fail to serve hundreds of millions of poor Chinese. Our
environment is heavily polluted and many of our local officials
are corrupt. Few of our citizens are protected by health insur-
ance or pensions. The absence of the rule of law makes it
more difficult to resolve all of these problems and deprives our
people of a sense of justice, equality and opportunity.
All of these problems have led to tension where there should be
harmony. And this social tension will be exacerbated significantly
when the inevitable economic downturn arrives. When the down-
turn hits, it will be the first one we have experienced since estab-
lishment of the market economy. This means it will be the first
76 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Striving for Economic and Political Sustainability
downturn in an economic structure where most of the growth and
most of the employment comes from private companies. In past
downturns, the Party could instruct state-owned firms, which dom-
inated the economy, to continue producing, even if they could not
sell their products. In the next downturn, this will be impossible.
Private firms will shut their doors. Workers will lose their jobs.
This will be a new experience for modern China.
In past downturns, those workers lived in housing provided by their
state firm. Now, if they lose their jobs, how will they pay their
mortgages? 
In past downturns, education was provided by state firms. Now,
how will the unemployed afford to pay the fees necessary to keep
their children in school?
In past downturns, healthcare was also provided by state firms.
Now, how will unemployed private-sector workers pay for their
children or their parents to see a doctor?
This is why Party General Secretary Hu has directed us to begin
taking concrete steps towards building a harmonious society—
before an economic crisis develops. If we do not act now, we run
the risk of that economic crisis cascading into social chaos and
political instability.
Our task i s  easier
Our task sounds daunting, but is actually easier than that of our
predecessors. They had to initiate fundamental changes to the
structure of China’s economy and society, changes which raised
deep and often divisive ideological questions. We, however, are
faced in many cases with simply effectively implementing and
enforcing programmes and rules that are already in place. We
have, for example, a programme for compulsory education—we
must now enforce and fund it. We have rules to protect the envi-
ronment, which we must now enforce. We have laws to combat
corruption, and we must now enforce them in a fair and transpar-
ent manner. None of our challenges raise ideological problems.
We are also fortunate that our government is in good fiscal health,
so we have the money necessary to accomplish our task. In recent
years, tax revenue has been growing at 20% annually, and the fis-
cal deficit is only 1.3% of GDP. Total central government debt is
only 18% of GDP, and we have more than US$1 trillion in foreign
exchange reserves to serve as a buffer during a financial crisis.
In other words, we have no excuses not to act boldly.”
What “Harmony” Means fo rChina’s  Economy and forInves tors
The previous section of this article is our interpretation
of the internal discussion we believe is taking place with-
in the Communist Party as Hu Jintao attempts to win
support for his “harmonious society” campaign. Now we
will look at the impact of the campaign on government
spending and regulatory policy—and thus the Chinese
economy and investment environment—over the coming
five years. The success of Hu’s campaign will also be
critical to Beijing’s ability to manage the social and polit-
ical consequences of the economic downturn which will
inevitably come to the mainland during the next five to
ten years.
Macroeconomic po licy
At first glance, “harmonious society” may sound like an
anti-growth policy, with a focus on the environment,
income inequality and providing better social services.
Take a second look.
China’s Communist Party is still a pro-growth govern-
ment, but the objective is now balanced, higher-quality
growth. Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao are willing to sac-
rifice a bit of speed to manage the problems that threat-
en social stability, but it would be a mistake to read a
desire for 8%-9% GDP growth versus 11%-12% as anti-
growth. Hu and Wen understand that strong economic
growth is the foundation for a harmonious society. 
Strong growth generates the fiscal revenue to pay for bet-
ter health care and education. Strong growth translates
into income growth, reducing rural poverty and delaying
the day when widening income inequality becomes a
serious social problem. 
Strong growth is key to job creation, the leadership’s top
short-term worry. Real urban unemployment is likely in
the 7%-9% range (as opposed to the official 4% rate),
and higher levels would strain urban social services and
cut into the important flow of funds from migrant work-
ers back to poor rural counties. The government hopes
the economy will create nine million jobs this year, to
accommodate some of the five million college graduates
and seven million others who will enter the workforce. 
There are very few reasons for the government to take
steps to cool off an economy which is not overheated.
Since the fourth quarter of last year the Chinese econo-
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in three years of growth rates of electric power genera-
tion and industrial profits and margins. But you can
ignore the official GDP growth number for the first half
of 2007—11.5%—as Beijing is stuck with working from
the political fiction (too high) it has been issuing for the
past few years. The economy is picking up, but after
three years of slowing from a peak of 11%-12% in 2003.
By our calculations, growth is accelerating a bit from a
rate of 8%-9% last year, rather than double-digit figures.
The first half numbers do not signal overheating, or the
coming of serious government tightening measures.
We will see more of the quality-control measures (or token
tightening) that were implemented over the last year: addi-
tional small interest-rate hikes and more increases in bank-
reserve ratios. But these are designed to raise the cost of
capital to a more rational level, to restrain bankers from
lending like drunken sailors who have just hit the shore and
met cute CFOs showing off their voluptuous profits. The
macroeconomic impact of these measures will be similar to
what we have seen in the recent past: not much.
Yes, consumer price inflation is rising—5.6% in July, up
from 2.2% in January—but almost all of the increase has
come from food. The government will not panic, under-
standing that this is a largely temporary, supply-driven prob-
lem, and that higher interest rates in China would have lit-
tle impact on low domestic pork supplies or on high global
corn and soybean prices. For the first seven months of the
year, food accounted for 80% of the 3.5% increase in CPI.
Investment
From 2003 through 2006, fixed asset investment (FAI)
increased by 24-27% annually, and we expect the growth
rate to remain close to this range through the end of the
decade. This means China will continue to drive global
growth in demand for a broad range of commodities, from
oil to copper and nickel.
Several factors will combine to keep FAI expanding at this
rapid rate.
First, strong corporate profitability. Companies account for
three-quarters of gross capital formation, most of which is
financed by retained earnings, and profit growth is strong.
Even though the growth rate of industrial firm profits fell
sharply between 2003 and 2005, profit growth was still
27% in 2005. Profitability improved in the fourth quarter
of last year; pushing up profit growth to 31% for 2006. In
the first five months of this year, lower prices for industrial
inputs boosted profit growth even further, to 42% year on
year. Firms will respond by raising capex spending; pressed
by the government, some of this capex will be dedicated to
pollution-control devices and equipment to replace outdat-
ed technology that wastes power, water and other scarce
resources.
Second, the housing market will remain healthy.
Households account for another 15% of total investment,
mostly for housing. House prices have risen significantly
in recent years, but so has urban income. Nationally,
house prices rose 41% from 1999-2006, but income
jumped 101%. As in all countries, there are geographical
differences, and in Shanghai house prices outpaced
income, by 127% versus 89%. But, for most urban
Chinese, housing has become more affordable over the
last six years, helped by the recent availability of mort-
gages. (Nationally, in the first half of this year, real urban
disposable income rose by 14.2%, while house prices rose
by 6%.) We expect the government to continue to pro-
mote home ownership, especially by low- and middle-
income families.
Third, government infrastructure spending will increase.
The government accounts for about 10% of investment,
Graph 2. Growth of house prices and urban
per-capita disposable income
Graph 3. Mortgage growth
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and the combination of good fiscal health and the need to
build rural infrastructure linked to the harmonious society
campaign means that the growth rate of this source of
investment will rise. As detailed in the earlier section of
this report, the Party leadership is committed not only to
spending more on social services, but also on physical infra-
structure in the vast areas of China that have fallen behind.
Water. 300m rural people do not have access to clean
drinking water, so Beijing has said it will spend 6.4 billion
yuan [US$819 million] annually to provide clean water to
32 million villagers every year until 2010.
Power. The State Grid Corporation raised its spending on
transmission and distribution by 47% last year, to 176 bil-
lion yuan [US$22.6 billion], enabling it to deliver electric-
ity to another 545,000 rural households. The company will
raise its investment this year to 202.5 billion yuan [US$26
billion], and it hopes to provide power to all rural house-
holds by 2010.
Roads. Road investment has generated the largest returns
to GDP growth in the non-farm economy, and simple rural
roads have benefit-cost ratios for national GDP that are
about four times higher than the ratio for more expensive
roads. The government plans to build or upgrade 1.2 mil-
lion km of rural roads by 2010.
Urbanisation. China’s urbanisation rate has grown from
26% in 1990 to 44% today, and in the last five years, 78
to 85 million people moved to urban areas. The average
household making this move nearly doubles its per-capita
income over time, so Beijing will continue to encourage
urbanisation. We expect another 10 million people to move
to cities every year through 2010.
And while the government’s focus will be on the poorer
regions, we do not expect a substantial reduction in the
growth rate of investment in wealthier areas, as the Party
wants to keep the middle-class happy as well. 
In addition to building rural roads, the government says it
will extend the expressway system from 40,000 km in 2005
to 65,000 km by 2010, to keep up with continued double-
digit annual growth in auto sales.
Between now and 2013, six cities are slated to add subway
lines, at a combined cost of almost 550 billion yuan
[US$70 billion].
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China handles one-quarter of the world’s rail traffic on just
6% of the world’s total track length, and the system turns
away about as much cargo as it carries, so we expect signif-
icant investment in the network.
From 2005 to 2010 the number of deepwater berths at
China’s ports will increase from 393 to 1,183, and the
expected investment on container ports alone will reach
185 billion yuan [US$24 billion].
Beijing has reportedly budgeted 52 billion yuan [US$6.7 bil-
lion] for the construction of 37 new airports and expansion of
31 others, including Shanghai’s two airports. Hongqiao will
more than double its current 15 million passenger capacity,
and Pudong’s second phase will open in 2008, tripling its
capacity to 60 million passenger throughput.
This continued high level of investment is obviously very
bullish for global commodity demand. Over the last
decade, China accounted for 61% of the increase in world
consumption of steel, including 41% of the global increase
in 2006. China also generated more than half of the
increase in global consumption of copper and aluminium
during the last ten years, including one-third of last year’s
increase in copper consumption.
And China is increasingly dependent upon imports to feed
this voracious appetite for commodities. Ten years ago,
imports accounted for only 12% of China’s oil consump-
tion, but that share is now close to 50%. The share of
imported iron ore, copper and nickel have all risen signifi-
cantly as well.
Heavy industry conso lidation
The harmonious society effort to reduce pollution and raise
energy and resource-use efficiency will, over the coming
years, result in consolidation of many of China’s dirtiest
heavy industries. In sectors such as steel, chemicals, paper
and metals processing, enforcement of environmental pro-
tection laws will result in the closure of large numbers of
smaller firms that cannot afford to install the required
equipment. Local officials will also be under pressure from
Beijing to use environmental grounds to shut firms that are
inefficient users of energy but cannot afford to install more
advanced technology.
Dozens of small steel mills, for example, are surviving by
exporting low-grade construction steel that is priced signif-
icantly higher abroad than it is on the mainland, but that
leaves China exporting resources which are in short supply:
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Striving for Economic and Political Sustainability
energy, iron ore and water. There is plenty of room for con-
solidation, as 74 of the country’s 200 mills account for 65%
of total steel production.
The government would also like to raise the efficiency of
resource recovery in the coal industry, by shutting about
half of the 22,000 small mines, operations which usually
do not meet pollution (or worker safety) requirements.
Larger companies—in general, the listed firms in these sec-
tors—will have to spend quite a bit to become compliant
with pollution and energy efficiency regulations, but this
cost will be outweighed by the impact of consolidation.
Most sectors are plagued by overcapacity, which is the pri-
mary reason margins have been squeezed in recent years.
The closure of a significant number of smaller producers
should allow the larger, listed firms to regain some pricing
power, more than making up for the added expense of
cleaning up their emissions.
Regulato ry  pol icy
The harmonious society campaign will have a large impact
on government regulatory policy, as the Party seeks to
reduce corruption opportunities and boost the private sector.
It is clear that over-regulation provides many channels for
corruption, as companies must seek a wide range of
approvals from local officials just to engage in routine busi-
ness. As the Party works to reduce the level of rent-seeking
opportunities for officials, we expect Beijing to relax controls
over mergers and acquisitions by domestic firms, particularly
privately owned companies. There will also be increased
merger and acquisition opportunities for foreign firms, but
the government will continue to limit foreign access to sec-
tors considered strategic, including financial services.
We also expect the Party to build on the steps taken at this
year’s National People’s Congress towards creating a
stronger foundation for an entrepreneur-driven, market-based
economy. Premier Wen, the number two man in the world’s
number one Communist Party said his government will
“actively support the efforts of individuals to start their own
businesses.” And his finance minister added that “We will
continue supporting the policy-mandated closing and bank-
ruptcy of state-owned enterprises . . . [and] we will support
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.” 
Party support for entrepreneurs was signalled most clearly
when it was announced that the new corporate income tax
law passed by the NPC includes a tax break for small
firms—probably the first time the Party has given entrepre-
neurs a direct advantage over larger state-owned compa-
nies. Of course, the private sector already accounts for
70% of GDP and almost all new job creation, but an extra
endorsement from the Party leadership will help clear away
some of the political obstacles entrepreneurs often face
from bankers and local officials. 
The NPC also passed a property law which sends a clear
message to judges and local officials: “No matter if it is
state, collective or private property, it should be protected
equally. Otherwise people’s enthusiasm to create and accu-
mulate wealth in legal ways will be impaired, and the coun-
try’s prosperity and social stability will also be harmed,”
according to the NPC’s spokesman. 
We also expect regulatory progress on financial services,
granting domestic firms the flexibility to offer a wider range
of products, while raising the level of oversight to reduce cor-
ruption and raise investor confidence. With 86% of China’s
financial wealth held in cash (versus 19% in the US), this
will open a goldmine of opportunity. We have already seen
examples of the possibilities, with assets under management
by the funds industry climbing by 50% last year, and we
expect life-insurance premium revenue to rise 15% this year.
Consumption
Finally, if the harmonious society campaign is successful,
81N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
esGraph 5. China drives global growth 
(1995-2006)
Graph 6. China’s rising import dependency
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
and people believe that significant progress is being made
towards creating a viable social safety net and relieving
their burden for health care and education costs, house-
hold savings rates will slowly start to come down from the
current high levels (equal to 30% of GDP and 16% of
household disposable income), boosting the private con-
sumption share of GDP. Retail sales have grown by more
than 10% annually for the past several years, and by 16.4%
in the first seven months of this year, so there is no doubt
that a consuming culture is firmly entrenched in China.
Consumer finance will continue to expand—the number of
credit cards rose to 20 million last year from 0.5 million in
1999—facilitating the sale of consumer durables. Concluding  Remarks
With Hu Jintao clearly determined to make progress
towards a “harmonious society” the focus of his second and
final term as Party Chief, we expect to see substantial
progress on the social, environmental and political prob-
lems that he has targeted. Although we do not expect Hu
to fix China’s health care system or to deliver a clean and
green environment in just five years, we do anticipate
enough progress to be achieved so that when the inevitable
economic downturn arrives in five to ten years, the country
will avoid political and social chaos. And while Hu is will-
ing to accept slightly slower economic growth to manage
the problems that threaten social stability, he continues to
understand that a strong economy is the foundation for a
harmonious society. •
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